Error filtration is a method for encoding the quantum state of a single particle into a higher dimensional Hilbert space in such a way that it becomes less sensitive to noise. We have realized a fiber optics demonstration of this method and illustrated its potentialities by carrying out the optical part of a quantum key distribution scheme over a line whose phase noise is too high for a standard implementation of BB84 to be secure. By filtering out the noise, a bit error rate of 15:3% 0:1%, which is beyond the security limit, can be reduced to 10:6% 0:1%, thereby guaranteeing the cryptographic security. DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.94.230501 PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 42.50.Dv, 42.81.2i One of the central results in quantum information is that errors can, in principle, be corrected [1, 2] . This discovery transformed quantum information from an intellectual game into a field which could revolutionize the way we process information. Practical realizations of quantum error correcting codes are, however, extremely difficult because they require multiparticle interactions. A first experimental demonstration of quantum error correction has recently been realized [3] , but it is still very far from being usable in practical applications. An alternative method, called error filtration, allows errors to be filtered out during quantum communication, and can in contrast be easily implemented using present technology [4] . The main idea of error filtration is to encode one qubit in a single particle within a Hilbert space of dimension greater than two. It is then possible to detect, with high probability, whether an error has occurred, and if so, to discard the state. This quantum error detection scheme is less powerful than full error correction, but, for many applications such as quantum key distribution (QKD), discarding the state affected by noise is sufficient. The advantage of this method is that the encoding and decoding operations do not require multiparticle interactions, hence they are relatively easy to implement by interferometric techniques.
One of the central results in quantum information is that errors can, in principle, be corrected [1, 2] . This discovery transformed quantum information from an intellectual game into a field which could revolutionize the way we process information. Practical realizations of quantum error correcting codes are, however, extremely difficult because they require multiparticle interactions. A first experimental demonstration of quantum error correction has recently been realized [3] , but it is still very far from being usable in practical applications. An alternative method, called error filtration, allows errors to be filtered out during quantum communication, and can in contrast be easily implemented using present technology [4] . The main idea of error filtration is to encode one qubit in a single particle within a Hilbert space of dimension greater than two. It is then possible to detect, with high probability, whether an error has occurred, and if so, to discard the state. This quantum error detection scheme is less powerful than full error correction, but, for many applications such as quantum key distribution (QKD), discarding the state affected by noise is sufficient. The advantage of this method is that the encoding and decoding operations do not require multiparticle interactions, hence they are relatively easy to implement by interferometric techniques.
Here, we report on a proof-of-principle experimental demonstration of the capabilities of error filtration. For a detailed theoretical introduction to the method, we refer to [4] where it is also shown that error filtration can be extended to the purification of entanglement. Our experimental scheme is based on the fiber optics ''plug-andplay'' quantum cryptosystem [5, 6] and its extension to more than two dimensions introduced in [7] . The interest of error filtration is illustrated by performing the optical part of a QKD scheme over a noisy quantum communication channel with so much noise that a secure BB84 protocol cannot be realized. (BB84, introduced in [8] , is the standard protocol used in QKD. It is based on the use of two maximally conjugate bases in a two dimensional space.) It is known that if the bit error rate (BER) exceeds 14.6%, then a simple cloning attack makes the BB84 protocol insecure. On the other hand, if the BER is lower than 11.0%, then the BB84 protocol is provably secure; see [9] for a review. Between the two boundaries lies a gray zone where the security of BB84 is unknown [10] . In our experiment, we consider an error prone QKD scheme with a BER 15:3% 0:1%, which is therefore insecure. Using error filtration, the BER is brought down to 10:6% 0:1% so that QKD is rendered secure. Nevertheless, the present work will probably not have immediate practical applications because phase noise is not the main limiting factor in present day QKD. However, better detectors and new techniques such as quantum repeaters (see [11] for a recent proposal) will be used in the future. Then, the contribution of phase noise could become the main limiting factor and error filtration could provide a solution. Finally, note that it was realized previously that the use of higher dimensional systems can increase the resistance of QKD to noise [12] . Error filtration presents advantages over these earlier suggestions as we discuss below.
Our experimental error filtration setup works with attenuated coherent states traveling in localized time bins in optical fibers (standard SMF-28); see 8156A), and then split by a first 50=50 coupler (C 1 ) to produce two pulses. These pulses impinge on the input ports of a polarization beam splitter (PBS) with a time delay 60 ns. Their polarizations are rotated, using polarization controllers, so that the two pulses exit by the same port of the PBS. Next, the two pulses are processed through an unbalanced Mach-Zehnder (MZ) interferometer C 2 C 3 with a path length difference equivalent to 2. This produces four emerging pulses traveling down a 900 ns delay line (representing the noisy communication channel). Then, at Alice's site, the pulses are reflected back by a Faraday mirror. The use of a Faraday mirror makes the setup insensitive to birefringence in the delay line. Alice may modify the phases of the four pulses using a phase modulator ( A ) (Trilink) controlled by a pattern generator (Agilent 81110A). When they reach Bob's site, the pulses pass through the MZ interferometer and interfere at the C 2 coupler, which, as we shall show, realizes error filtration. The six emerging pulses then travel trough Bob's phase modulator ( B ) (Trilink) and the PBS to the coupler C 1 , where they interfere and are sent to a single-photon detector (id Quantique id200) via a circulator. The detector was gated by a pattern generator during a 5 ns window around the arrival time of the central pulse. Its output was registered using a time-to-digital delay converter (ACAM-GP1) connected to a computer. All electronic components were triggered by a pulse generator (Standford Research Inc. DG355). In order to maximize the interference visibilities, polarization controllers were introduced in the long arm of the MZ interferometer and in front of the polarizationsensitive phase modulators. Once optimized, the setup was stable for days.
Before discussing error filtration, let us first consider the case where the MZ interferometer C 2 C 3 is absent. Then our setup is identical to the plug-and-play quantum cryptography setup [5] . The wave function describing the state after Alice has encoded her phase A can be written as 1 2 p jt 0 i H ÿ e i A jt 1 i V , where the subscripts H and V represent the polarization states while the subscripts 0 and 1 represent the relative delay of time bin i, i.e., t i i . In the BB84 protocol, the phase A must be chosen randomly in f0; 2 ; ; 3 2 g. The ( ÿ 1) phase in front of jt 1 i V takes into account the conventional relative phase of =2 between the reflected and transmitted light at coupler C 1 and at the PBS. The state leaving Alice's site thus reads
where the polarizations have been interchanged because of the Faraday mirror. Intrinsic noise in the plug-and-play QKD scheme is actually very low, see [6] , so that in our experiment we had to simulate the noisy channel by making Alice's phase modulator imperfect. This was achieved by electronically combining the signal from the pattern generator with the output of a function generator (Agilent 33250A) producing Gaussian electronic noise with an adjustable amplitude and a 50 MHz 3 dB bandwidth. Since the time bins are separated by 60 ns, the phase noise in the successive time bins can be considered as independent. The state produced by Alice is thus
where the ' i 's are independent random phases drawn from a Gaussian probability distribution P' i 2 g. Bob's detector is connected to either output port P 1 or P 2 . The probability for Bob to detect a count (assuming a perfect detector) is (7). The open circles show filtration in the quantum regime where the state sent by Alice contains on average 0.8 photons (which is in the regime where QKD is secure against photon-number splitting attacks [13] ). The inset magnifies the data in the region where one passes from an insecure (V 70:7%) to a secure (V > 78:0%) QKD protocol. The crisscrossed area shows that a visibility that is either insecure or of unknown security can be increased to a provably secure one. By averaging over 200 000 runs, the error bars were made smaller than the plotting points. interference fringes measured by Bob is
The measured values of V (after subtracting dark counts) agree well with this prediction; see the lower curve in Fig. 2 . Note that the visibility is related to the bit error rate via BER 1 ÿ V=2. The idea of error filtration is that if the noise on the different time bins is independent, then one can reduce its effect by using more than two time bins. Indeed, if the receiver lets several time bins interfere then the noise will have a tendency to average out in the useful constructive port, while the anticorrelated part of the noise is rejected. This globally reduces the noise at the expense of intensity; see [4] . In order to implement this idea we use the additional MZ interferometer C 2 C 3 . Each pulse exiting from the PBS is split into two pulses by the MZ interferometer according to
The factor 1=2 takes into account that half of the intensity is lost at coupler C 3 . After Alice has encoded her phase A and the pulses have been reflected by the Faraday mirror, the state becomes 
where the sign depends on which output port (P 1 or P 2 ) the state exits. When the photon comes out in time bin t 3 , the visibility of the interference fringes, assuming that the noise affecting the different time bins is independent, is V 2=1 e 2 :
Comparing with Eq. (3) we see that filtration affects an increase of visibility. The generalization of Eq. (7) to the case where Alice uses 2N time bins to encode her qubit is immediate. One finds that the visibility becomes V 2N N=N ÿ 1 e 2 ; see [4] .
There are two sources of loss in the above implementation. The first is not intrinsic to the method and is due to the photons ending up in time bins t 1 and t 5 after Bob's measurement, see Eq. (6), which do not have improved visibility and are therefore discarded. In principle this could be remedied by replacing coupler C 3 by a switch that deterministically sends pulses t 0 and t 1 in the initial state Eq. (5) along the long path and pulses t 2 and t 4 along the short path. We did not implement this because high speed low loss switches do not exist commercially at present. The second source of loss is intrinsic to the method of error filtration: visibility is enhanced by separating the signal into two components: a noisy one which is discarded and a good one which is kept. This intrinsic loss occurs in our experiment at coupler C 2 in time bins t 2 , t 3 where the light emerging from the unused output port (P 4 ) is completely noisy and is simply discarded. The probability of discarding the state in port P 4 is zero in the absence of noise and increases to 1=2 as the amount of noise increases. This should be contrasted with the fact that no intrinsic losses occur at coupler C 1 : both output ports P 1 and P 2 contain useful information.
The measured average visibilities (after subtracting detector dark counts) are plotted in Fig. 2 as a function of the phase-noise standard deviation in the case where Alice applies A 0 and Bob measures the output port P 1 . In this case, without noise, the maximal visibilities exceeded 99%. With unfiltered noise (lower curve), the visibility decreases exponentially with the amount of noise in accordance with Eq. (3). The filtration achieved by our setup (upper curve) is also very close to the theoretical prediction of Eq. (7). Visibilities in the range from 65% to 78% are enhanced, by filtration, to the range from 78% to 85%; see inset of Fig. 2 . Noting that the security threshold BER < 11:0% translates into V > 78:0% while the insecurity threshold BER 14:6% corresponds to V 70:7%, we conclude that our setup transforms a BB84 protocol which is insecure (or of unknown security) into a provably secure one. Note that the visibilities were also tested for the other possible values of A =2, , 3=2 used in the BB84 protocol and for both ports P 1 and P 2 . The visibilities all exceeded 97.2% in the case where no noise is added. The lowest visibilities are associated with the cases where Alice and Bob choose the f 2 ; 3 2 g basis since then both parties must apply a potential to their phase modulator which makes the setup noisier.
In Fig. 2 , the visibilities were measured in a regime where the overall number of photons in all time bins when they leave Alice's site is approximately 120 photons. In this way, the dark counts of the detector are negligible. To consider a realistic QKD implementation, we also ran the experiment in the regime where the quantum state sent by Alice back to Bob contains on average approximately 0.8 photons in total (which is in the regime where QKD is secure against photon-number splitting attacks [13] ). The difficulty in this case is that dark counts become very important (they give a raw error rate of about 30%) because we use 3-ns pulses [14] . Nevertheless, we were able to show in this regime that a visibility of 69:4% 0:2% in the absence of filtration can be turned into 78:8% 0:2% by filtration (where the statistical error due to subtracting the dark counts was calculated for a 95% confidence level); see open circles in Fig. 2 . These visibilities are averaged over all four choices of A and for the two output ports P 1 and P 2 , so they are the relevant quantities for characterizing a QKD scheme. This averaging explains why these points lie slightly off the curves in Fig. 2 . Note that in QKD the errors due to the dark counts can in principle be removed using error correction codes without altering the security, although in practice this is probably impossible for the high level of dark counts we have here.
We conclude by comparing this method with other QKD schemes that use higher dimensional systems [12] . The noise model in both cases is the same: a d-dimensional state j i entering the communication channel exits as e ÿ 2 j ih j 1 ÿ e ÿ 2 1=d. This makes the comparison meaningful. The QKD schemes based on sets of mutually unbiased bases considered in [12] can only tolerate a noise level up to e ÿ 2 < 1=2. This is because when e ÿ 2 1=2, there is a simple attack in which the eavesdropper (Eve) does not modify the state with probability 1=2, while with probability 1=2, she keeps the state and sends a random one instead. In contrast, error filtration can tolerate arbitrarily high levels of noise if d is sufficiently large since the visibility V d tends to 1 for large d and fixed e ÿ 2 . The reason why the above attack no longer works in the case of error filtration is that when Eve replaces the quantum state by a random one, the filtration preferentially removes the corresponding noisy term. In other words, the noise is replaced by a higher effective loss. On the other hand, this means that a QKD scheme using error filtration can be vulnerable to attacks which exploit loss when weak coherent states are used, such as photon splitting attacks. However, recent work [13] shows that this is a less serious issue than initially thought.
In summary, the present experiment demonstrates the optical part of a quantum key distribution scheme which can operate with a phase-noise level that is too high for a standard implementation of the BB84 to be secure. This demonstrates the power and simplicity of error filtration as a practical method for circumventing phase noise in quantum communication.
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